


SECRET

CIA Internal Use Only

*Access Controlled by
the Directorate of
Support*



CIA HISTORICAL STAFF

The Support Services Historical Series

AGENCY TRAINING

AUGUST 1949 - JULY 1951

SECRET

OTR 4

July 1970

Copy 1 of 3

W A R N I N G

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification
--


SECRET

CIA Internal Use Only
Access Controlled by the Directorate of Support

THE DDS HISTORICAL SERIES

OTR 4

AGENCY TRAINING
AUGUST 1949 - JULY 1951



25X1

25X1



Hugh T. Cunningham,
Director of Training

HISTORICAL STAFF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

Foreword

In the development of training in the Central Intelligence Agency, the period from October of 1949 to July of 1951 was a period of transition, a period during which training practice and doctrine inherited from the Office of Strategic Services developed and changed and became responsive to the distinctive needs of CIA. From the beginning of CIA in 1947 until the Agency's second birthday in 1949, the OSS training patterns, both conceptual and organizational, continued. The brief passage through the interim Central Intelligence Group had left them unchanged, and it was not until CIA had established an identity and character of its own that the old patterns could be altered to meet the new needs.

The inheritance from OSS was, of course, entirely operational in orientation -- training related to clandestine activities; the people who directed and conducted the training were part of the inheritance and were themselves operational in orientation. It was only natural, then, that until the Agency developed its own training policy and identified the need for a broader spectrum of training, the operational orientation

~~SECRET~~

continued, and the training staffs continued to be components of the clandestine services. It was not until July of 1951, when all Agency training activities were consolidated within the Office of Training under the command of the Director of Training, that the period of transition was completed.

Preceding this period of transition, there was a period of transfer, the period during which OSS training concepts and disciplines were transferred from OSS, through CIG, to CIA. That period is described in detail in SS Historical Paper No. OTR-2, History of the Office of Training, 1945 - 1949. The present paper picks up the narrative of Agency training development where that paper ends.

Perhaps it should be noted at this point that the segmentation of the history of an institutional activity -- like that of the history of an empire, of a nation, or of a great religious or cultural movement -- is often determined not alone on the basis of developmental phases but also on the basis of leadership. Thus we find that identified with each of the developmental phases of training in the Agency there is a man, or a group of men, who gave direction to events and character to

SECRET

SECRET

achievements. The period covered by this paper, then, is not only one of transition; it is also one during which a small group of men led by helped to shape the future of Agency training.

25X1

-v-

SECRET

~~SECRET~~Contents

	<u>Page</u>
Foreword	iii
I. Development of the Training Division	1
A. Background	1
B. Administration	2
1. Command	2
2. Budget	3
3. Personnel	4
4. Training Liaison	6
C. Training Requirements	8
1. Mission and Function	9
2. Objectives	10
3. Doctrine	12
D. Overseas Training	18
E. The Director of Training	21
II. The Expansion of the Training Division	32
A. Organizational Structure	32
B. Staffing Problems	35

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~


	<u>Page</u>
C. The Rotation Problem	40
D. Space	43
E. New Courses	45
III. Special Problems in Training	51
A. Auditors	51
B. Outside Lectures	54
C. The Pool	55
25X1 [REDACTED]	
25X1 E. Improvement of Quality	59
IV. [REDACTED]	65
A. Area Training	65
25X1 B. The Area Training Branch	-67
[REDACTED]	68
1. Establishment	68
2. The Classes	69
3. Problems on the Post	70
4. Field-Headquarters Relationships	72
5. Problems with Trainees	74
D. Mobilization Training Program	76

~~SECRET~~

SECRET


Page

25X1



V. Summary and Conclusion	94
A. Temper of the Times	94
B. Summary	95
1. Development of TRD	95
2. Expansion of TRD	97
3. Special Problems	98

25X1



C. Chronology	101
-------------------------	-----

Appendixes

A. Identification of Positions	105
B. Mission and Functions of TRD	111

SECRET

SECRET

	<u>Page</u>
25X1 C. Remarks to Training Review Committee . . .	113
Index to Persons Mentioned	115

SECRET

SECRET

AGENCY TRAINING, OCTOBER 1949 - JULY 1951

Chapter I

Development of the Training DivisionA. Background

5X1 On 5 August 1949, [] was appointed Chief of the Training Staff of the Office of Special Operations (OSO). * On 14 September of that year, by agreement between OSO and the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), [] was formally named Chief of OPC training ** and thus the training elements of the two operational Offices were combined. On 17 October, the Deputy Assistant Director of OSO addressed a memorandum to [] as "Chief of the Training Division, OSO/OPC." Thereafter the unit that [] headed was referred to officially as TRD -- organizationally attached to OSO but serving the training needs of both OSO and OPC. From that time until [] left the Agency to return to the Army, in April of 1951, his task was to consolidate the existing training activities of OSO and OPC and to develop new programs to meet the operational needs of the Agency. The problem of first priority was that of establishing the kind of administrative framework within which TRD could function most effectively.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[] 5 August 1949, SECRET
September 1949, SECRET

25X1

SECRET

~~SECRET~~B. Administration

The problem of TRD administrative relationships was a natural consequence of the merging of two units which, although devoted to a common mission, had different origins, different loyalties, and different objectives. Inherent in the situation were problems of command channels, financial management, personnel actions, and liaison activities.

1. Command. Before the formal merger of the OSO and OPC training units, the skeletal training branch of OPC had relied upon OSO facilities for many of its training requirements, and coordination had been achieved through a Joint Training Committee made up of representatives from OSO and OPC. When TRD was created, a decision concerning a single command channel had not yet been made, and the Joint Training Committee -- at that time composed of the Chief of TRD, the Executive Officer of OSO, and the Chief of Support of OPC -- continued to provide command guidance. For organizational convenience, TRD was considered a component of OSO. In a memorandum dated 16 December 1949, addressed to the CIA Management Officer, the Executive Officer of the Agency stated that the Director of Central Intelligence wished to delay action on the determination of a single

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

command channel for TRD until the National Security Council had made a decision regarding an amalgamation of OSO and OPC. The memorandum further stated that the "current combined committee-type of control" was temporarily authorized, with TRD being responsible to both the Assistant Director for Special Operations (AD/SO) and the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination (AD/PC).

The Joint Training Committee, then, continued to control the activities of TRD; and TRD continued to be charted as a component of OSO. The OPC personnel serving as members of TRD were considered to be in an on-loan status. This "temporary" command structure made it possible for TRD to function as a training unit serving the needs of both OSO and OPC, but it created a number of sticky administrative problems, the most difficult of which was the structure and management of the TRD budget.

2. Budget. When TRD was established, in October of 1949, it was decided by the Joint Training Committee that budgetary matters would continue to be handled on an ad hoc basis -- as they had been since 17 September -- until command channels had been established. The December 1949 decision of the DCI to defer determination of command channels made it necessary for the Committee to face the

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

budgetary problem and try to find a solution. In a meeting on 4 January of 1950, the Committee did face the problem and considered possible solutions. None of the alternatives, however, appeared to be workable, and the Committee decided to continue the ad hoc approach.

In February of 1950 the OSO funds available for training appeared to be running out, and in March the Committee met with the finance officers of OSO and OPC to work out a course of action. In that meeting it was agreed that when OSO training funds were completely spent, OPC would provide -- from existing accounts -- the money to support TRD activities for the rest of the 1950 fiscal year. At this time, the Committee, with the concurrence of the OSO and OPC finance officers, recommended that the two Offices contribute equally to the TRD budget for the 1951 fiscal year. This recommendation was never officially approved, but it became the basis for continuation of the ad hoc approach to TRD budget problems, an approach that kept TRD in business until it found a secure budgetary home in the Office of Training in July of 1951.

3. Personnel. The lack of clearly defined command channels during the 1949-51 period made personnel actions just as hard to handle

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

as budgetary matters. The Chief of TRD was responsible for the administrative supervision of all personnel in the Division, but control of the table of organization, position classification, and candidate qualifications was exercised by the Office of Personnel; and personnel actions proposed by the Chief of TRD had to be approved and authorized by either the Executive Officer of OSO or the Chief of Staff II of OPC, depending upon the parent Office of the person involved in the action. In effect, then, the Chief of TRD carried the responsibility for personnel administration in the Division but had no authority to make decisions.

In January of 1950, the Joint Training Committee worked out an agreement with OSO and OPC whereby all promotion actions for people assigned to TRD were to be approved by the Committee, and all travel requests and travel vouchers were to be approved by the Executive Officer of OSO only -- regardless of the parent Office of the person affected. This arrangement proved to be workable, and at least one of the administrative problems of the Chief of TRD was solved.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

4. Training Liaison. As early as 1948 the Training Staff of OSO had established liaison with the other units of OSO through Training Liaison Officers (TLO's), officers who, in addition to their major duties with their units, served as points of contact on training matters. These TLO's met frequently with members of the Training Staff for discussion of mutual problems. As the OPC Training Branch began to develop, late in 1948, it became apparent that a similar TLO arrangement was needed in OPC; but it was not until August of 1949 that an effort was made to establish systematic procedures for designating OPC TLO's. The minutes of the 3 August meeting of the Joint Training Committee record the recommendation that OPC designate operations and planning officers to act as TLO's.

Apparently implementation of the recommendation was slow in coming. On 4 October of 1949, after [] had taken over as Chief of both OSO and OPC training, OPC had not yet come up with a list of operations and planning officers who would serve as TLO's. The minutes of the Committee meeting held on that date record that the list would be forthcoming soon. Those minutes also record that [] stressed the urgent need for orienting all TLO's to training procedures and recommended that at the next meeting of TLO's

25X1

25X1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

with TRD officers, Division Chiefs of both OSO and OPC be present. There is evidence, however, that the TLO problem was slow in solution.

At a meeting of all TLO's on 10 February 1950, [] distributed a "Training Liaison Officers Guide," outlining general procedures to be followed, delineating TLO functions, and describing the activities of TRD. Apparently the Guide failed to accomplish its mission, at least in OPC, for in May of 1950 [] issued a long memorandum describing procedures for handling OPC students in training. This was followed, on 1 July, by a revised TLO's Guide and by another memorandum explaining in greater detail the proper procedures for enrolling OPC personnel in training courses and following them through to the completion of the training. It appears that a part of the problem with OPC personnel in training was the frequent use of pseudonyms and aliases, which created almost endless confusion; other factors -- as [] pointed out to his staff -- were lack of planning for OPC training and failure of the TLO's to study the various guides that had been prepared for them.

25X1

25X1

25X1

At a meeting of the Joint Training Committee in December of 1950, the TLO problem was being discussed, and Mr. William

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

25X1

[] -- the OSO representative on the Committee -- suggested that a partial solution of the problem might be the appointment of a full-time TLO in each of the Offices. [] agreed with the idea and went ahead with the paper work necessary to implement it.

25X1

25X1

In February of 1951, [] who had been in agent training since OSS days, was appointed OSO Training Officer. Similar action was not taken by OPC, but the appointment of [] marked the beginning of the senior training officer system that is still in effect in the Agency.**

25X1

C. Training Requirements

One of the major problems that [] inherited when he became Chief of TRD in October of 1949 was the identification of training requirements. Before the merger of the Training Staff of OSO and the Training Branch of OPC, no systematic attempt had been made to re-define the old OSS training requirements in terms of the needs of CIA -- probably because those needs had not themselves

25X1

* For identification of positions held by major OSO, OPC, and DDP officers, see Appendix A.

25X1

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

25X1
been clearly defined. In facing the overall problem of training requirements, [] found that concise statements of training missions and functions depended on agreed conclusions concerning training objectives, that training objectives could be defined only in terms of operations doctrine, and that training requirements could be determined only after doctrine had established objectives and objectives had clarified missions and functions.

25X1
1. Mission and Function. On 25 July 1950, [] sent to the AD/SO and the AD/PC a memorandum on "The Mission of the Training Division." The memorandum was a statement of the mission and functions of TRD as [] saw them at the time. Approval was not requested, and the statement of mission and functions was not 25X1 issued as an official TRD document. Actually, [] memorandum was unofficially approved by both AD/SO and AD/PC, and subsequently it was used as a major guideline in instructor training courses. 25X1

25X1
The statement placed heavy stress on training requirements. Indeed, the first of the functions listed by [] was "to ascertain the training requirements of OSO and OPC," and the entire text of

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

the statement makes it clear that training missions and functions remain intangible until requirements are determined.* Implicit in the statement was the conclusion that the first step in the determination of requirements was the definition of objectives -- both quantitative and substantive.

25X1 2. Objectives. The TRD effort to determine realistic and specific training objectives was a continuing one. It began informally when [] became Chief of TRD; it was, in effect, formalized by the 25 July memorandum; and as late as March of 1951 the Joint Training Committee was urging OSO and OPC to give TRD more specific requirements. The Committee pointed out that identifying the general needs of the operating Offices was not enough; TRD had to have a breakdown of the training load in terms of the courses that were given. TRD had found, for example, that it was not getting as many students for "area" training as had been estimated; if this shortage should continue, TRD would have to move some "area" instructors to staff training or covert training in order to meet the demands of

* The text of [] statement on TRD mission and functions is given in Appendix B.

25X1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

those activities. [] said that TRD needed not only a specific statement of the long-range requirements, but also a general statement forecasting the trends to be expected for various types of training. This forecast was needed immediately so that TRD could plan properly. These needs were never really met, and consequently TRD was drawn into preparing for requirements that never materialized.* 25X1

On 14 November 1949, OPC had circulated throughout the Agency a memorandum asking for comments on the effectiveness of OPC's existing structure. The comments were for the use of a committee that had been assigned to study the organization and function of OPC. On 15 November [] responded with a memorandum that listed a number of difficulties that TRD had experienced with OPC because of its organizational structure. He noted that the personnel of the Planning Division and those of the Operations Division differed widely in their understanding of training objectives. He said that he had observed that some officers of the Planning Division did 25X1

25X1

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

not feel that they should take the same training courses given to the Operations personnel. In trying to get substantive training objectives from the two Divisions, TRD had found wide discrepancies in the viewpoints of the planners and the operators. As a result, TRD could not design courses that met the requirements of both Divisions. In his memorandum [] also noted that the planners represented certain activities and the operators represented certain areas; in his view, this difference constituted a basic flaw in the structure of OPC.

25X1

OPC also had some complaints about TRD at this time. In December of 1949, [] reported to his staff that the AD/PC felt that the Intelligence Orientation Course was too strongly weighted in favor of OSO activities. It was then decided that some effort should be made to revise the course to reflect a more nearly even distribution of coverage of OSO and OPC -- an example of the kind of make-shift compromise necessitated by the lack of clearly defined objectives.

25X1

3. Doctrine. It is interesting that in none of the documents recording TRD efforts to identify training requirements and formulate training objectives is there a definition of the word "doctrine" or a

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

clarification of the relationship of doctrine to objectives. It must be assumed that before the appearance of OPC there was no real need to define either the word or the relationship. The OSS concept of "doctrine" being operational -- the accepted and organizationally approved principles that govern methods and techniques of operational activities -- and "objectives" being the specific training goals to provide the capabilities to apply the doctrine, had been carried over; and the Training Staff of OSO had no major problem of defining objectives consistent with doctrine. With the advent of OPC, however, and the merging of the OSO and OPC training units, new and different operational activities were introduced; doctrine for them evolved slowly, and training objectives could not be formulated in the absence of doctrine.

25X1

[redacted] recognized this problem soon after he became Chief of TRD, and in December of 1949 he made an organized effort to solve it. At that time it had been decided -- there is no record of how or by whom -- that OPC required training courses in [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

[redacted] announced that each of the TRD instructors assigned to

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

the development of one of these courses would be responsible for the writing of a training manual for his course. Deadlines of from three to six months -- varying with the different courses -- were set, and the instructors were told to develop the doctrine upon which the manuals would be based.

By June of 1950, [] had concluded that TRD should not and could not be responsible for the development of doctrine, and in a meeting of the Joint Training Committee on 15 June he so informed the OPC member of the Committee. It was then agreed that OPC itself would take on the task of preparing the manuals, working from topical outlines supplied by TRD.

25X1

Staff I of OPC was assigned the job of developing the doctrine and preparing the manuals. In October of 1950 the OPC member of the Committee reported that Staff I had set March of 1951 as the earliest possible completion date for the manuals. The major reason for the slow progress, according to Staff I, was the extreme difficulty in reaching agreement on doctrine. In early April of 1951 the draft of the first of the manuals -- [] -- was submitted to TRD and was found wanting; TRD instructors felt that it failed to identify doctrine and it needed considerable revision

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

before it could be useful in training. Progress continued to be slow, and as late as December of 1951 TRD was finding the manuals being prepared in OPC to be of variable usefulness. The manuals on covert 25X1

[redacted] for example, were almost useless in giving instruction in clandestine operations; they merely presented general surveys of overt methods of operations. 25X1

[redacted]
use as far as the definitions and general policy were concerned.

This dragging out of the writing of manuals by OPC finally led TRD to take the initiative in setting up a more orderly approach. 25X1
On 7 April 1951, [redacted] who had been an instructor in TRS and TRD since 1948, submitted a memorandum to the Chief of 25X1
TRD on the subject of the development of doctrine. [redacted] took the position that although the responsibility of TRD in the development of doctrine was not openly recognized in the operating Offices, the tendency to depend on TRD had become increasingly apparent. He suggested a priority emergency program aimed at determining and identifying the doctrinal material that was being used in training at that time. He suggested a second emergency program aimed at putting

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

on paper the doctrinal fundamentals of each of the specialized fields of clandestine activity. These programs as he saw them^{wn} could be carried out by small numbers of qualified people working as task forces in TRD for three or four months. [] also recommended a 25X1 third, long-range program aimed at the orderly and continuous review of basic doctrine and of its relevance to operational experience; this program would require an adequately staffed and supported "doctrine development" group.

25X1

On 23 July 1951, [] (Acting Chief of TRD after [] departure) set up a Doctrine Development Staff along the lines suggested by [] The job of the Staff was to insure that the content of all instruction in TRD would be operationally sound and consistent with the policies of OSO and OPC. TRD Administrative Instruction 70-3 set up a procedure for the Doctrine Development Staff to follow in reviewing regularly all lesson plans, lecture outlines, problems, and study material used in all courses.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Actually, the Doctrine Development Staff was an outgrowth of a committee that [] had established in June of 1950 -- the "Training Review Committee." The members of this group were

[]

25X1

-16-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

25X1

25X1

[redacted]

[redacted] Although the task assigned the Committee was a broad one -- to review the mission, the instruction, and the existing procedures of TRD and make recommendations for improvement -- the major problem the Committee was concerned with was the development of doctrine. The Committee held its last meeting on 19 June 1950, and its final report was commended highly by [redacted]

25X1

Although the Committee did not, as we have seen, solve the doctrinal problems of TRD, it made a major contribution to the rapport of TRD with both OSO and OPC. In a 30 August 1950 memorandum addressed to the Chief of TRD, the AD/PC, [redacted] praised the work of the Committee and commended the Chief of TRD for his proposals of action based on the Committee's recommendations; and on 25 October 1950 [redacted] AD/SO, addressed a similar memorandum to the Chief of TRD.

25X1

25X1

When [redacted] left the Agency in April of 1951, the problems of identifying training requirements had not been completely

25X1

25X1

* A summary of [redacted] remarks to the members of the Committee appears in Appendix C.

SECRET

SECRET

solved, but measurable progress had been made. The need for defined operational doctrine as a necessary basis for training objectives had been clearly established, missions and functions of TRD had been clarified and specified, and training requirements could be identified with some assurance that they would be responsive to the needs of the operating Offices.

D. Overseas Training

Closely related to the problem of identifying OSO and OPC training requirements at Headquarters was the problem of TRD support for Agency training activities overseas. During World War II, the OSS Training Unit had had no direct responsibility for the content of the training given in overseas areas, but it did support those activities by training instructors and providing training materials. When CIA was created in 1947, this relationship was easily transferred to the Training Staff of OSO, along with other OSS practices and procedures, and no major problem developed until OPC was formed on 1 September of 1948. OPC initiated a number of projects that involved the training In the early stages, these projects were supported by the Training Branch of OPC;

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

and when the OSO and OPC training units were merged in September of 1949, TRD became responsible for the support of OPC overseas training activities as well as those of OSO.

As these overseas training programs developed, it became apparent that TRD could not give them adequate support by treating them as peripheral activities. By August of 1950 the requirement for sending training materials to overseas activities had grown to the point where it was necessary for the Joint Training Committee to establish an Overseas Training Materials Review Committee, a three-man group with OSO, OPC, and TRD representation. The task of the Review Committee was to examine all training materials to be sent overseas and ensure their appropriateness. This function solved a part of the problem only, and in November of 1950 established a Special Projects Staff composed of four TRD instructors; this Staff was charged with the responsibility for preparing complete plans for all non-Headquarters training projects, both in the United States and abroad. Such plans included cover and security arrangements, the selection of safe training sites, the provision of special training aids, and substantive course outlines. The Staff was also

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

responsible for the coordination of the special programs with the operating units of OSO and OPC.

The work of the Review Committee and the Special Projects Staff gave TRD the capability of muddling through the overseas training problem, but it was obvious that a greater effort was needed. A 4 May 1951 report of the Review Committee, for example, stated that the bulk of the training materials needed overseas was much too great for the Committee to handle properly and that some of the operating units of OSO and OPC were bypassing the Review Committee and independently preparing training materials for overseas use. The report concluded with the statement that TRD needed a fully manned, full-time unit with the responsibility for preparing and adapting training materials for overseas use. TRD did not at that time have the personnel to assign to such a unit, and the make-shift treatment of the overseas training problem continued until the establishment of the Overseas Training Branch in the Office of Training in 1955.*

* See SS Historical Paper No. OTR-5, History of the Office of Training, 1951-1966. SECRET.

SECRET

SECRET

E. The Director of Training

On 15 November 1950, the appointment of Col. Matthew Baird as CIA Director of Training was announced.* The announcement was transmitted to the Deputy Directors by the CIA Executive, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] with an explanatory memorandum stating that Col. Baird's staff would be a "division" of the Executive's administrative group, that as of 1 January 1951 Col. Baird's "division" would begin the development of a Career Training program, and that at a "later date" Col. Baird would coordinate and supervise all Agency training.**

Neither the document appointing Col. Baird nor the Executive's memorandum transmitting the document clarified the relationship of Col. Baird's "division" to TRD, and the "later date" reference in the memorandum was ambiguous, at best. The ambiguity was partly resolved by a 30 November 1950 memorandum from Col. Baird to

25X1

* [REDACTED] SECRET

** For a detailed discussion of the circumstances of Col. Baird's appointment and the organizational status of his "division," see the CIA Historical Staff paper, Organizational History of [the] Central Intelligence Agency, 1950-1953, SECRET, [REDACTED] Chapter X, "The Conduct of Agency Business," p. 75 ff.

25X1

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

[] requesting a report on the functions and long-term personnel needs of TRD. The requested report was completed and sent to Col. Baird on 5 December. In considerable detail it described the organization and functions of TRD and assured the Director of Training that TRD wanted his cooperation "as regards the continued implementation of an intimate coordination and compatibility between it [presumably TRD] and the covert offices. Such a liaison is of utmost importance for the maintenance of the present caliber of training for operational personnel." The report also stated that "the training establishment must have free access to and the closest coordination and cooperation with the planning, operational, and administrative elements of the covert offices."

25X1

25X1

On 6 December 1950, Col. Baird and [] met in the office of [] the Executive Officer of OSO, for a general discussion of problems. According to [] memorandum recording the meeting, Col. Baird stated that as new Chief of Training for CIA, he had no intentions of taking over the functions of TRD at that time and, as a matter of fact, he did not know whether he would ever concern himself with taking over that activity. Col. Baird also stated that his staff had been established primarily to

25X1

25X1

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

plan for career management and the development of personnel; he wanted to make it clear, however, that if he could be of any assistance whatever to the TRD program, he would be at the disposal of the Chief of TRD.

Col. Baird's denial of any intent to take over the functions of TRD re-cast the shroud of ambiguity over the "later date" reference in the CIA Executive's memorandum of 15 November, and [redacted] 25X1 was left in confusion and concern. On 13 December [redacted] 25X1 wrote a memorandum to the AD/SO and the AD/PC on the status of TRD. He said that he feared that the pending reorganization plan for the Agency might remove TRD from the direction and control of the two covert Offices and make it a part of CIA Administrative Services. He felt that such a step would fail to recognize that training for OSO and OPC was really operational support. He further felt that the move would be detrimental to OSO and OPC in that it would reduce the effectiveness of the training for their operations. He pointed out that experience had demonstrated that training is more effective when it is close to operations. He also felt that such a change would lead to the weakening of operational security and of the overall effectiveness of TRD because the rotation of instructors would become

SECRET

SECRET

impracticable and thus the flow of information about current operational techniques would be curtailed. He felt that for policy guidance and operational direction, it was imperative^a that TRD continue under the control of OSO and OPC.

25X1

In this paper [] was restating the position that had been taken by his predecessor, [] in January of 1949 when the OSO training unit was faced with the possibility of being taken over by the Office of Personnel.* The conviction that training activity was an integral part of clandestine operations was deeply felt by the training officers who had strong ties to OSO, and they viewed the advent of the new Director of Training with suspicion and misgivings.

25X1

25X1 Although CIA REGULATION [] dated 1 December 1950, made it clear that the newly established Training Division had functions different from those of TRD, and although OSO REGULATION No. [] dated 30 December 1950, referred to TRD as part of the OSO structure, 25X1 with [] as his deputy, there

25X1

* See SS Historical Paper No. OTR-2, History of the Office of Training, 1945-1949, pp. 39-40. SECRET.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

continued to be considerable uneasiness in TRD, OSO, and OPC about the role of Col. Matthew Baird and its relationship to operational training. This problem was the subject of frequent discussion in the meetings of the Joint Training Committee in January and for some time thereafter.

On 25 January 1951, Murray McConnell, then the Deputy Director for Administration, addressed a memorandum to the AD/SO asking him to authorize [] to discuss training programs freely with Col. Baird. McConnell stated that he felt that Baird and [] could be of great help to each other and he wanted [] to know that he had the AD/SO's authority to discuss his operations. A few days later the AD/SO, [] authorized the Chief of TRD to discuss all training programs and operations under his direction with the Director of Training, Col. Baird.

Although confusion about Col. Baird's position had persisted for some time, there was none in the mind of the DCI, General Walter B. Smith. In a characteristic memorandum dated 22 March 1951 and addressed to Mr. McConnell, the DD/A; [] the AD/PC; Gen. W. G. Wyman, the AD/SO*; and Col. Baird, the DCI said:

* General Wyman [] on 14 February 1951 by CIA GENE

~~SECRET~~

When I established the office of the Director of Training, it was my intention that he should plan, direct, and supervise the basic training for operational personnel of the Agency. Accordingly, the function of the Assistant Directors in charge of SO and PC operations would be to establish minimum specifications for the basic training of their personnel, to observe, correct, suggest to, and assist Col. Baird in carrying out this service for the Agency at large. Thus, as my representative for training, Col. Baird would proceed to produce basically trained personnel for Agency operations in accordance with the specifications furnished him by the Assistant Directors concerned. I do not want the basic training compartmented, and I see no difficulty in handling it under centralized direction.

If you perceive serious objection, please see me personally.

The DCI's position was further clarified on 18 April 1951 with the issuance of CIA Regulation which transferred the Office of Training from the DDA area to the Office of the DCI and gave Col. Baird the authority to "Supervise all Agency training programs and conduct such general training programs as may be required to meet Agency needs."

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

25X1

[redacted] left the Agency in April of 1951 to return to the Army, and [redacted] was appointed Acting Chief of TRD.

On 23 April 1951 in a memorandum addressed to the AD/SO and the AD/PC, Col. Baird clarified his relationship to TRD and the covert Offices, as he understood that relationship. He said that he wished to confirm certain procedures that would enable TRD to continue to discharge its responsibilities in an efficient and secure manner.

These procedures were:

a. The Director of Training proposed to furnish to TRD such staff supervision, guidance, and policy coordination as might be necessary to insure that the desires of the DCI were met. The DTR would give all possible assistance in the maintenance of effective training support.

b. The AD/SO and the AD/PC would continue to provide to TRD, through the Joint Training Committee, their training requirements, including the measures necessary to protect the security of their operations and personnel.

c. The DTR and the Assistant Deputy Director for Administration (Special) would join the Joint Training Committee so that the DCI might be fully informed of the

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Training Division's problems and to insure that TRD received the Agency support that it would need. Col. Baird actually initiated these procedures at once. The minutes of the Joint Training Committee show that he began to attend the Committee meetings at the end of April.

TRD had always been shown on the organization chart of OSO. It is obvious that there had always been a strong feeling that "covert" training should remain under OSO, and the establishment of the office of the Deputy Director for Plans (DD/P)* did not change the belief that the Training Division should continue to be under the control of the covert side of the Agency. On 26 June 1951, the DD/P notified the AD/SO and the AD/PC that TRD would be detached from OSO as of 1 July and established under the DD/P, with [] as Acting Chief. This arrangement was evidently not acceptable to the DCI, to whom Col. Baird was reporting directly. In early July the DCI issued a directive (later issued as CIA REGULATION [] and dated 1 July 1951) assigning "Training (Covert)" -- as TRD

25X1

25X1

25X1

* By CIA GENERAL ORDER [] dated 4 January 1951, SECRET Mr. Allen W. Dulles was the first DD/P.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

was re-named -- organizationally to the Director of Training. At the same time, [REDACTED] USA, was designated Assistant Director of Training (Covert), and [REDACTED] was designated Assistant Director of Training (Overt). The organization chart included in CIA REGULATION [REDACTED] showed "Covert Training" as a block in dotted lines under the DD/P. In a memorandum of 28 September 1951, the Executive Officer of DD/P explained this as showing that although the Director of Training was responsible for directing and coordinating covert training in the United States, the DD/P had retained responsibility for similar activity overseas. The DTR was to coordinate with the DD/P on overall policies and programs and was to provide staff supervision when requested. This information was

[REDACTED]

In effect, then, although the covert training unit was nominally under the DTR it was still being directed by the DD/P; and as late as January of 1952, * the Office of Training, with Col. Baird as Chief, was still being shown on DD/P organization charts as reporting to the DD/P. CIA NOTICE [REDACTED] of 13 February

* Although the information given here goes beyond the time-span of this paper, it is provided to complete the narrative of the transfer of TRD to the Office of Training.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1952, however, described the organization of the Office of Training and stated specifically that the Office was within the office of the Director of Central Intelligence and that the Director of Training reported to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. A 15 July 1952 memorandum from the DCI described the organization of the Clandestine Services, to become effective on 1 August 1952, and stated that a responsibility of the Director of Training was to provide to the DD/P adequate support for all clandestine activities, and that continuous liaison between the Director of Training and the Chief of Administration for the Deputy Director for Plans was to be maintained. Thereafter, a training organization did not appear on the organization chart of the Clandestine Services.

After it was established in July of 1951 that the former TRD was indeed under the organizational jurisdiction of the Director of Training, Col. Baird proceeded cautiously in the establishment of a relationship. Most of the people in the covert training organization did not know him or understand his function. He was first introduced to the Training (Covert) [TR(C)] people at a meeting of all TR(C) personnel on 31 October 1951, held in the auditorium of the Recreation and

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

25X1

Services Building. The meeting was called by to acquaint all Office of Training people with the developments and progress of TR(C).

Col. Baird proceeded at once to study the organization and management of the unwieldy component that had been added to the Office of Training. On 11 July 1951, he addressed a memorandum to the Deputy Director for Administration (DD/A) requesting a management survey of what had been TRD and of the whole Office of Training. He asked that, in view of the organizational change that had transferred TRD to OTR, the survey be made as soon as possible. He noted that the transfer had raised certain administrative problems, and he sought guidance on the organization of OTR, on the allocation of funds, on space requirements, and on the security protection of covert operational training. On 21 July 1951, Col. Baird wrote to the Agency Advisor for Management and stated that his primary consideration in requesting the survey was the hope that a new plan would ensure the utmost security protection for covert operational training, protection that was a part of the Director of Training's responsibility for all Agency training. He said that he felt that covert operational training should be compartmented within OTR and be granted the autonomy of action necessary in the interests of security.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Chapter II

The Expansion of the Training Division

Chapter I of this paper has discussed the development of TRD within the framework of its relationships with other components of the Agency -- primarily with OSO and OPC and finally with the component headed by the Director of Training. Chapter II is concerned with the internal development and expansion of TRD and covers the component structure of the Division, the staffing and space problems attendant upon the growth of these components, and the development of training courses initiated within these components to meet the ever-increasing requirement levied upon TRD.

A. Organizational Structure

When the training units of OSO and OPC were merged on 17 September 1949 to form TRD, one of the first problems that faced Col. was that of setting up an organizational structure. It seemed apparent at the time that the missions of TRD could be classified in three categories: training in covert operational techniques (trade-craft); training in activities; and

25X1

25X1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

training of non-staff covert personnel - [REDACTED]

25X1

Consequently, TRD's first organizational structure was composed of three units: Staff Training, [REDACTED] Training, and Covert Train-

25X1

ing. It soon became obvious that the assessment and evaluation function could not be handled satisfactorily as a peripheral part of the instructor's job, and an Assessment and Evaluation Unit was created.

When TRD was given the responsibility for the "holding" operation -- the unclassified training of provisionally cleared employees -- a

Branch was established for that activity.* Naturally the support

structure grew along with the instructional units, and by June of 1951

the Support Branch included a Records and Registration Staff, a Doctrine Development Staff, a Planning Staff, and a Training Materials

Staff; there were also in the Support Branch an Administrative Officer

25X1

and [REDACTED]

In October

of 1949, when [REDACTED] was appointed Chief of TRD, the Table of

25X1

Organization (T/O) of the Division authorized [REDACTED] in April of

25X9

1951, when [REDACTED] left the Agency, TRD had an authorized T/O

25X1

of [REDACTED] positions.

25X9


* See below, p. 55.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

At the time that TRD officially -- if only nominally -- became a part of the Office of Training in July of 1951, it was operating with an organizational structure that had been authorized by the Assistant Deputy Director for Administration on 7 March 1951. The Staff Training Section was offering three principal courses -- Staff Orientation, Operations, and Advanced Operations. There was an Advanced Specialized Training

25X1



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

for training related to special projects.* The Assessment and Evaluation Unit had three parts -- Psychological Assessment Branch, a Research and Validation Branch, and a Training Evaluation Branch. The Support structure of TRD remained as it is described above.

B. Staffing Problems

During the rapid expansion of TRD, the problem of finding qualified instructors to fill the authorized T/O was a major one. In February of 1950, [] told the Joint Training Committee that instructors were urgently needed for both the Operations Course and the Advanced Operations Course and that 40 percent of the authorized positions in TRD were vacant. The OSO representative on the Committee said that OSO would screen the lists of returning field personnel to see if any qualified instructors could be made available.

25X1

In March of 1950 [] again pointed out the great need for instructors; at that time there were 26 vacancies. He reported that the operational branches of OSO and OPC had been approached in an effort to find personnel to man the Operations Course and the

25X1

* See below, p. 83.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Advanced Operations Course, in both of which the need was particularly critical. In addition, he stated, TRD was trying to locate possible instructors in other Government Agencies -- CIC and FBI, for example. The OSO representative said that the rotation policy of OSO might make a few individuals available to TRD in the near future. In July of 1950, [] issued a memorandum to all TRD instructors pointing out the pressing need in all Branches and asking them to prepare lists of names of possible candidates whom they might know personally.

25X1

At a meeting of the Joint Training Committee in October of 1950, [] showed that the new T/O then awaiting approval would have a total of 73 vacancies in instructor positions. He did not see how TRD could meet the training requirements unless operationally qualified instructors were secured. The OSO and OPC representatives on the Committee stated that it was impossible to release personnel from OSO or OPC for assignment to TRD at that time. Again, in November of 1950, the personnel needs of TRD were called to the attention of the Committee, but it was concluded that nothing more could be done to recruit instructors, and the hope was expressed

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

that the new DCI might make changes in the personnel procurement procedures to improve the situation for the Agency as a whole.

25X9

As of 7 December 1950, TRD had an authorized T/O

25X9

Actually, the shortage was not critical as the statistics might indicate. In May of 1951, the Chief of the Agency's Personnel Division pointed out that TRD had a total of 267 vacancies against which only 126 recruitment requests had been submitted. Fifty six of the vacancies were slotted for the project, ** not yet actually launched. More than 100 of the total TRD vacancies on the T/O were

25X1

* See below, p. 76.

** See below, p. 84.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

positions could not be filled until the new training area had been procured, and many of them were low-level jobs for which it would be preferable to recruit locally. In spite of these facts, TRD was still hard pressed to find qualified instructors for critical courses.

Clerical personnel also were in short supply during this expanding period. On 27 September 1951, for example, Training (Covert) -- then an element of the Office of Training -- had a T/O that approved 90 clerical positions, and only 36 of them were filled. On 6 November the situation was unchanged.

The really critical problem, however, continued to be the procurement of instructors. The generation of a large requirement for handling trainees [] was the principal cause of this pressure for additional instructors. In January of 1951, for example, a large training organization was being planned to cope with 300 trainees a month,* half of whom would go into [] courses and half of whom would go into staff training courses. It was planned that this operation would begin in the summer of 1951.

25X1

25X1

* See below, p. 77.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Writing to the Agency Advisor for Management regarding the instructor procurement situation, Col. Baird, on 21 July 1951,* noted that the T/O of Training (Covert) was only about 40 percent full in spite of the high priority given it by Personnel Procurement. He felt that one of the explanations was the low salary level: good instructors could not be procured at the GS-09 to GS-11 level. He pointed out that OSS alumni could not be induced to come back by the offer of a GS-11 and said that after two months of effort he had been unable to recruit a single qualified language and linguistics instructor at the salary level that he could offer. He stressed that if the Office of Training was to meet the training commitments it had accepted, it would have to be able to offer instructors a salary they could accept. He felt that the practice of classifying instructors according to what they taught was unfortunate in that it put the classification people in a position of having to judge the relative merits of the subjects taught. He asked, for example, what are the relative values of an instructor in the Russian language and an instructor in Advanced Operations?

* Here again the information given goes beyond the time-span of this paper; it is provided to complete the account of the staffing problem.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Col. Baird said that he would prefer to have an Office of Training "Faculty" T/O on an Office-wide basis and be able to use that faculty where he needed to, depending on the versatility of the individual and the training needs at a particular time. He pointed out that the then-current OTR procedure of unit slotting necessitated a juggling of slots and grades that was not always honest and often required subject-matter comparisons that were invidious. He also pointed out the need for sufficient numbers of GS-14 and GS-15 slots to enable the Office of Training to recruit and hold the personnel it needed, and he stressed the point that the reorganized Office of Training would have a T/O in excess of [] persons, would train thousands of people a year, and would spend millions of dollars a year. To all intents and purposes, the Office of Training had Office status under the DCI, and such status, he felt, should be recognized officially by appropriate grade ratings.

25X1

C. The Rotation Problem

During this 1949-51 period, the staffing problem was compounded -- as it had been for years and would continue to be -- by a policy that called for the rotation of instructors. In a 1948 planning paper,

[]

Chief of the OSO Training Staff before TRD was

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

formed, had emphatically urged continuation of the policy of regular rotation of instructors to operational assignments in order to keep the instruction up-to-date and consistent with recent field experience.

25X1

[] actually prepared a complete rotation plan for each of the 32 people on duty with his Staff in December of 1948, but he could not carry it out. In April of 1949, he again raised the question of the orderly rotation of personnel and submitted a plan for an OSO "Personnel Board." In that planning paper he stated, "I sincerely believe that we should have within OSO a top-level board approach to one of the most important parts of our period of growth -- the proper selection, placement, and rotation of personnel."

25X1

[] views on rotation policy. At a meeting of the Joint Training Committee on 13 April 1950, the question of rotation of TRD personnel was considered, and it was generally agreed that those persons who had been in training for a number of years should be reassigned, even though TRD was short of instructors. The implementation of the agreement, however, proved to be very difficult. At another meeting, on 5 September 1950, the Committee reaffirmed the policy that to the greatest extent possible, TRD people who had served the allotted time as instructors should be reassigned

SECRET

SECRET

to operational divisions. It was recognized, however, that in order to effect such a policy, TRD would have to have qualified replacements, and at that time TRD was losing more people than were being replaced.

In October of 1951 -- some months after the departure of Col.

25X1 [] -- the policy on rotation was reaffirmed in a paper submitted to the Director of Training by [] Chief of Training (Covert).

25X1

This paper provided a comprehensive plan for the orderly rotation of TR(C) instructors. In a later supplement to his paper, [] set forth the basic premise that the Agency would be best served by continuing rotation of personnel from the operating offices to TR(C) and from TR(C) to the operating offices, and that the length of a tour as instructor should be two years. He further stated that certain key personnel in executive and administrative posts should not be subject to this general policy of rotation.

25X1

25X1

On 10 December 1951, [] showed his concern and frustration by addressing to the Director of Central Intelligence a memorandum on the subject of the staffing of covert training, describing the instructor situation as extremely critical, with the number of students rising and the staff overdue for rotation to other assignments. He believed that the only adequate solution was for OSO and OPC to supply

SECRET

SECRET

TR(C) with personnel in substantial numbers at once. As they were not doing so, he proposed as an emergency measure the rotation of the most deserving of the TR(C) staff members no later than 1 April 1952, even though it might mean either a curtailment of the training program or a lowering of the number of trainees. This proposal was not acceptable to the DCI, and it was not adopted. In January of 1952, [] was transferred to a staff position in OSO.

25X1

During the period before July of 1951, TRD was acquiring a reputation as a unit that would not release its people for other assignments. This reputation, deserved or not, made both the acquisition of new instructors and the reassignment of TRD instructors more difficult. On their own initiative, some TRD instructors promoted -- or at least negotiated -- reassignments for themselves. On 18 June of 1951,

25X1

[] Acting Chief of TRD, issued a memorandum to all TRD personnel regarding changes of assignments. He noted that in the previous few weeks a number of cases had come up involving transfer of people to the operating offices and that these transfers had been made either without his knowledge or without proper clearance and, consequently, had led to administrative confusion and personal

~~SECRET~~

embarrassment. The response to the memorandum indicated that there had been misunderstandings about whether or not some people had gotten proper releases. He then put TRD personnel on notice that an orderly procedure would be followed in the future.

D. Space

Because of the rapid growth in personnel, courses, and students in 1950 and 1951, TRD needed additional classroom and office space to supplement that already in use in Buildings [] T13, and T14.

25X1

25X1 Building [] was remodeled in the summer of 1950, and the Basic Orientation Course and the new rapid reading course moved into that building in the fall. In June of the same year, the Basic Orientation

25X1 Course had moved from T13 to []

25X1 The Administrative and Operations Courses were being held in [] which had a small auditorium, adequate library space, and a number of classrooms and offices of various sizes and shapes. Covert

25X1 Training had been set up in L Building, the Basic and Interim Study course (the "pool")* was in [] and the Assessment Unit was

* See below, p. 55.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

25X1

[] At this time steps were taken to procure space in the so-called Recreation and Services (R&S) Building. [] origi- 25X1
nally wanted to use the large gymnasium in R&S for the physical conditioning of OSO and OPC personnel, but this could not be worked out, and the gymnasium became a classroom.

25X1

The Office of Training continued to occupy [] and most of R&S for many years. Pressure for additional classrooms and offices in these early years led to the gradual occupation of space in a number of other buildings also -- Central Building, Eye Building, Quarters Eye, 1016 16th Street, and Alcott Hall. There were also a number of training sites under cover -- the Covert Training safehouses and the field training installations.

This scattering of personnel and activities did not make for efficiency. Most of the buildings were old temporary structures that did not provide satisfactory classroom space. For several years -- until air conditioning was finally approved -- classes were subject to dismissal during very hot weather, when rooms often had temperatures in the high 90's. Ventilation was poor at best, fans were noisy, and roofs leaked. It is a considerable tribute to the students and to the staffs of

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

the Office of Training that they put up with the conditions with as much patience and understanding as they did.

E. New Courses

25X1

During the period when [] was Chief of TRD, the staff was hard pressed to keep up with the demand for new courses to meet the expanding requirements of OSO and OPC. A number of problems developed, in addition to those of finding instructors with the knowledge and experience to handle sophisticated new subject matter and of acquiring approved doctrine. There was the matter of obtaining clearance and approval for training materials that were developed. In August of 1950, the Chief of TRD insisted that although the proposed

25X1

[] outline looked good to him, it was essential that it be acceptable to all of the foreign Division Chiefs of OPC and be coordinated with them to make sure that it incorporated techniques that were applicable to their areas of operation. In September of 1950, the prospectus for the [] and those of three other new TRD courses were submitted to the Joint Training Committee for approval. The approval was given quickly, but the coordination with the OPC Division Chiefs was long in coming.

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

At the end of 1950, the Staff Training Branch of TRD was offering three courses for the staff officers of OSO and OPC. The first was the Staff Orientation Course (also variously known at the time as the Basic Orientation Course and the Basic Intelligence Course). It introduced basic tools and techniques, such as reporting and interviewing, and included a week of study on Communism and the USSR. The material used in this course was not highly classified. Students then went into the Operations Course, which for the most part took up the methods and techniques of clandestine operations (tradecraft). The third course, the Advanced Operations Course, presented discussions of the Agency's clandestine missions and of the major operational tasks of OSO and OPC.

Between 1 December of 1949 and 30 November of 1950, 208 students went through the Staff Orientation Course; 276 through the Operations Course; and 160 through the Advanced Operations Course. By February of 1950, the training load had become such that the Staff Orientation Course began to overlap successive runnings. For a while the instructional staff in was beginning a new four-week Staff Orientation Course every two weeks, with a full classroom at each end of the building. The Operations Course also tried the overlapping scheme,

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

and other expedients were tried. At one time the Operations Course was given in the auditorium of and consisted entirely of lectures, a small group of students -- selected on the basis of projected assignments -- staying on for an additional week of exercises and problems. As early as December of 1949, the rush to training was on, and training requests so far exceeded the student capacities of the courses that the requests were being sent to the Executive Officer of OSO and the Chief of Support of OPC for decisions on the priority selection of trainees. Beginning in December of 1949, new personnel were not entered in formal training classes but were scheduled for "Basic and Interim Study" so that they would be under TRD control from the day of entrance on duty until they had completed all their training.

25X1

It was generally felt in OPC that much of the material in the Staff Orientation, Operations, and Advanced Operations Courses was not applicable to the work of many of their staff officers; and OPC requested a concentrated indoctrination course as a single substitute for the three courses. By the end of November of 1950, a short "Staff Indoctrination Course" (SIC) was ready for presentation. It was aimed primarily at giving the students an introduction to the missions, functions, and organization of OSO and OPC. During 1951, the class was split for many of

SECRET

SECRET

the lectures -- OPC people were not exposed to lectures on OSO activities and vice versa. Until OSO and OPC were actually combined, students from each Office were kept in the dark about the activities of the other. For a time the Staff Orientation Course even ran separate sections so that OSO people and OPC people would not meet each other.

During 1950 several advanced courses were developed by TRD:

25X1

[redacted] USSR Operations, Communist Party

25X1

Operations, [redacted] Later,

25X1

courses in [redacted]

Planning were added. All of these courses depended to a great degree on the participation of operational specialists from OSO and OPC, and there were many course revisions and changes through the years.

In 1950 the Staff Training Section was presenting -- in addition to the three major courses -- an Investigative Techniques Course and a Basic Photography Course. Staff Training was also responsible for the "interim studies," which was designed to enable students to conduct independent study and research during periods when they were awaiting clearances or assignments. In December of 1950, the Rapid Reading Course began in Building [redacted] The students spent one hour a day for six weeks using various machines designed to increase the student's

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

speed in the scanning of reading material. Because of the influx of new instructors, an Instructor Training Course was also offered by Staff Training. It met each morning for a week, and all TRD instructors were enrolled. The course covered the mission and functions of TRD, methods of instruction, and methods of testing and evaluation.

During 1950 the Administrative Training Course was completely revised. This course was designed primarily for junior administrative assistants, clerks, and typists from both OSO and OPC. The primary purpose of the course was to introduce the students to the pertinent administrative procedures of the two covert Offices. The course was concerned with both headquarters and field administrative problems, and it relied heavily on outside speakers. At this time -- during 1950 -- it was deemed necessary to section the class so that OSO employees heard only OSO material and OPC employees heard only OPC material.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Chapter III

Special Problems in Training

During the 1949-51 period when TRD was developing organizationally and expanding its activities to meet the many new requirements levied upon it, there arose a number of special problems -- problems that were peripheral, perhaps, to the major mission of TRD but problems that had to be solved to permit the fulfillment of the major missions. In this chapter a few of these problems are described.

A. Auditors

Because OSO and OPC followed no clear policy on enrollment in full-time training courses, many new employees who were under pressure to begin their jobs tried to get the required training by "auditing" courses. This meant that either they attended classes without participating in exercises, quizzes, and discussions, or that they attended lectures as time permitted and inclination moved them. For those who wanted to avoid written evaluation of their performances in training, auditing provided an easy escape. The instructors were not opposed to having available space occupied, and they rather welcomed

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

the idea of an auditor category because in this way the classes could be kept small -- the staging of class problems and the writing of evaluations remained manageable; but when the Agency began to expand rapidly, the situation became serious.

In January of 1949, the Basic Course had 13 full-time students and five auditors; in August of 1949, there were 20 students and five auditors. In January of 1949, the Advanced Course had 19 students and 19 auditors; by August the class had 11 full-time students and 12 auditors. During the entire period between 1 August of 1948 and 31 July of 1949, OSO had 287 full-time students and 148 auditors; OPC had 16 students and 31 auditors.

By September of 1950, the situation had become worse. In a memorandum of 7 September 1950, the Chief of Staff Training pointed out to the Chief of TRD that the number of people in courses was increasing but those who were enrolled as auditors were attending no more than two or three lectures. He said that some of these auditors might later claim credit for "completing" the course on the flimsy basis of having attended a few lectures.

In October of 1950, the problem of auditors was the subject of a discussion in a meeting of the Joint Training Committee. Both the

SECRET

SECRET

OSO and the OPC members stated their opposition to the practice, and the Committee agreed to a policy that the auditing of courses was to be strongly discouraged. In the future, approval would be granted only after a very careful review of each case, and the Registrar of TRD was instructed to consult the OSO or the OPC member of the Committee when the number of auditors exceeded a "reasonable" number. It was also agreed that the Committee should look at the problem again after 60 days.

The problem was gradually resolved as the number of students to be trained became so large that every available seat was occupied by a full-time student. In both OSO and OPC the realization grew that auditing was no substitute for training; only in the case of high-ranking officials was the practice really approved (for example, early in Col. Baird's career, a program was drawn up to enable him to audit the essential elements of all the courses then being presented.)*

* See above, p. 26.

SECRET

SECRET

B. Outside Lectures

The 1949-51 period saw the beginning of a new policy that has continued to the present time. A memorandum of 26 July 1950 from the Executive Officer of OSO to the AD/SO reported a conversation between [] the OSO member of the Joint Training Committee, and [] in which they agreed that responsibility for arranging for Agency personnel to give lectures for various other governmental activities should be delegated to the Chief of TRD. The AD/SO approved this delegation because he felt that TRD had more speakers readily available to meet outside requests than did the operating elements, and the use of instructors represented a minimum interruption of operational activities.

TRD then began to provide lecturers for other agencies of the government and to arrange for speakers from other parts of the Agency, as well. For example, in December of 1950 []

25X1

[]
tured on intelligence subjects to the Strategic Intelligence School of the Army. In 1951 [] of TRD was lecturing regularly on Russian espionage at the Office of Special Investigation Training School of the Air Force.

SECRET

SECRET

C. The "Pool"

25X1

A memorandum of 30 September 1949 from [] of OPC to [] indicates that in OPC a procedure had been in effect since 26 July 1949, designed to keep "semi-covert" OPC operational personnel "busy and under control" until such time as they could enter formal training classes. She pointed out that this procedure, an alternative to assignment to the "uncleared pool" with its attendant security risks, appeared unduly elaborate and cumbersome; most of the individuals concerned, after being entered on duty quite covertly, would eventually lose their covert status by taking courses in Agency buildings. A simpler procedure was then set up. These students became a separate section of the TRD Basic and Interim Study Courses (BISC), and were given prepared research directives which in most cases were related to area or operational problems of interest to the staffs and divisions sponsoring the students' training.

25X1

In a memorandum to the AD/SO and the AD/PC on 9 February 1950 [] explained that the aim of the BISC was to develop in the students a background for the areas to which they would be assigned and at the same time to implant a thorough security consciousness.

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

The research topics were on such subjects as "Strategic Aspects of China" and "International Politics of Greece;" for the most part, the research was done at the Library of Congress, using overt sources.

A list of topics being worked on in April of 1950 shows such subjects as "Refugee Groups in Germany," "Labor Problems of the Salonika Area," and "Oil in the Arab World." By October of 1951, the number of students in this program became so great that the load was becoming such that the one TRD man assigned to the program could not handle it, and plans were drawn up for a staff of four, with appropriate space and accommodations, to handle up to 100 students a month from both OSO and OPC. In January of 1952, plans had been made to include lectures, movies, and group discussions on such unclassified topics as "Understanding Foreign People" and "Formulation of Foreign Policy."

The history of this OSO-OPC "pool" is a complicated one. It is made even more confusing by the fact that a separate pool was established in April of 1951 for intelligence analysts and other "non-covert" employees -- this was the unit established by OTR, before TRD became a part of OTR, and named the "Unclassified Training Group A" (UTG/A).


SECRET

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

SECRET

25X1



E. Improvement of Quality

While he was Chief of TRD, [redacted] pressed vigorously to improve the quality of the instruction. His Training Review Committee has already been described. ** In 1950 he initiated an Instructor Training Course. In March of that year, a Training Aids Specialist

25X1

25X1

* In May of 1948, [redacted] had visited Washington and had conferred with [redacted], then Chief of OSO's Training Staff.

** See above p. 16.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

and a Projectionist were hired; and in expectation of their services,

25X1 [] assigned an Educational Specialist to audit all courses, to identify areas where training aids could be used, and to hold follow-up conferences with the instructors and work out the exact nature of the aids.

25X1 . In February of 1950, [] issued a comment sheet that was to be filled out by the trainees at the conclusion of their training; it solicited student opinion on the quality of instruction and the quality of course content, and it invited the students' ideas for improvement. To encourage complete frankness and to ensure that the students' comments would not adversely affect their grades in the courses, the completed sheets were forwarded directly to the Chief of TRD in a sealed envelope without being seen by the instructors.

In July of 1950, Course Chiefs were asked to submit a percentage breakdown of how each instructor spent an average working day. The Chief of the Advanced Operations Course was eventually excused from this task when it turned out that during eight weeks of instruction carried on without a break he could not find the time to perform the analysis.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

On many occasions [] clarified his philosophy of training. On 28 August 1950, for example, he wrote the following on a routing sheet:

25X1

With the varying grade averages coming out of the Administrative Course, it is essential at this time that some mean standards be established. There is too great a tendency for the grades to fluctuate from a very low average to a high average and vice versa. As I visualize the situation, the instruction in the Administrative Course, and any course for that matter, should entail first, presentation of the principle in form of lectures, conferences, etc.; application of techniques in the form of exercises, demonstrations and so on; and finally a test to evaluate the students' knowledge of the principle and their ability to apply the techniques to a given problem.

He followed the conduct of the training very closely, and he established a practice of dropping in on classes from time to time and of walking unannounced into an instructor's office, sitting down, and asking the instructor about his problems.

25X1

When [] who had been an OSO officer, became [] Deputy in October of 1949, he was assigned a number of responsibilities; among them were the maintenance of training records, training evaluations, and instructor training. In April of 1950, [] spent a week at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where he had been an instructor during the war. He was briefed on all aspects

25X1

25X1

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

of instructor training and guidance at the Command and General Staff College, and he came back to TRD with many ideas about the conduct of instruction, the maintenance of records, and the preparation of

evaluations. He recommended -- and [] approved -- the

25X1

TRD adoption of the Leavenworth method of instructor training. Col.

25X1

[] called together all of the instructors to hear [] report

25X1

and to see a staged demonstration that illustrated conference methods and techniques.

Perhaps the most far-reaching result of [] recommendations was the requirement for lesson plans. A "Training Materials Officer" was appointed and directed to set up a folder for each presentation given in TRD courses (except covert training courses). This folder was to contain a presentation directive that had been coordinated with OSO and OPC; a bibliography, if appropriate; lecture outlines; and complete transcripts of the lectures. These folders were to be kept up to date by continual review and revision. Copies of charts and other handouts were also to be included. The lectures given by guest speakers were to be recorded, and [] was wired to make this possible.

25X1

25X1

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Although this lesson-plan program accomplished a great deal in the way of making instructors organize their material and provided a measure of control over the general content, it did not really work very well. The instructors resisted because they were carrying heavy loads of teaching and had difficulty in finding the time to work their notes into suitable form. More seriously, much of the material given in lectures was subject to change from one class to the next, in some cases because of Agency reorganization and in others because of revised procedures and doctrine. On 8 May 1950, for example, the Chief Instructor of the Operations Course reported a list of 37 lectures for which there were either outlines of transcripts, but he made the point that most of the lectures were preliminary efforts which, although doing justice to the topic, were not final formats, either in content or in manner of presentation.

The lesson-plan system really broke down because there was not enough clerical help to transcribe and type the huge volume of material and there was not available enough expertise to set up a review procedure to make real use of the folders after they had been produced. On 15 June 1950, for example, it was reported that 107 dictaphone belts and eight wire recordings were waiting to be transcribed; about

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

four hours were required for the transcription of each belt and each recording. After [] left TRD in April of 1951, the program was gradually abandoned under the pressure of more immediate demands on instructors and clerks.

25X1

25X1

One of [] greatest concerns was the control of guest lecturers. TRD had necessarily relied from the beginning on knowledgeable guest speakers from OSO and OPC. The Advanced Operations Course in November of 1949, for example, included the following guest lecturers []

25X1

[] More 25X1

than two-thirds of the lectures in all courses were given by guests. Control of the content of their presentations was a continuing problem.

Because of repeated complaints about the low quality of the guest lectures, [] issued orders in April of 1950 that an instructor had to be present during each lecture presentation, and that he should analyze the lecture by means of a check sheet that would eventually be forwarded to [] who would then present the results -- with suggestions for improvement -- to the Joint Training Committee. The problem was not solved by this device, however, nor by other directives and procedures brought to bear after [] had left TRD.

25X1

25X1

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

Chapter IV

25X1

[REDACTED]

The rapid expansion of training activities in 1950 and 1951 was the result of requirements projected by OPC and, to a lesser extent, by OSO as well -- requirements that were later to be described as "grandiose" by the Inspector General.* These requirements called for the establishment of large training facilities outside the Washington area. Such camps had been used by OSS, but they had been given up by the end of 1945 and were not considered again until the establishment of OPC. The following narrative is a summary of the activities of TRD during 1950 and 1951 in response to the requirements for expanded [REDACTED] training.

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]

* The Inspector General's report of the Survey of the Office of Training conducted late in 1953.


SECRET

Page Denied

Next 7 Page(s) In Document Denied

SECRET

25X1



5. Problems with Trainees. Thirteen of the students of the first class at TC-1, when they were debriefed, were critical of much of the instruction and suggested the need for a greater number of practical exercises. At least three of these men seemed to be improperly motivated for paramilitary work. An effort was made to cast the work in more practical terms and to improve the instruction

SECRET

SECRET

generally. TRD also tried to establish an evaluation system that would identify students who were not qualified or motivated for the training. When the members of class No. 3 performed very poorly in training and did not live up to the abilities indicated by their background and their test scores, an investigation was called for. In August of 1951, the Chief of the Training Evaluations Section of TRD compiled a report based on interviews with members of the class; he had investigated the reasons for the abnormally low training records, the low morale, the apathetic attitude, and the marked resentment and bitterness about their Agency jobs and the training they had received. He noted that 17 out of 18 students had performed worse in the third phase than they had in the first. Seven students had resigned from the program during training, one had been asked to leave, two had resigned upon completion of training, and one was in the process of resigning. Among the causes for this state of affairs he identified:

- (1) inadequate briefing of the candidates on their projected assignments at the time of original recruitment;
- (2) inadequate, inconsiderate, and poorly planned administrative handling of students by OPC prior to, during, and after training;

SECRET

SECRET

(3) inadequate protection of cover during the training;

(4) ineffective training techniques [redacted]

25X1

[redacted]

25X1

(6) lack of comprehension by OPC desk officers of the kind of training the students received (they were commonly identified in OPC as muscle-men).

Although as a result of this investigation steps were taken to cure the deficiencies in the program, the handling of the trainees at [redacted] continued to be a touchy problem to the end; at that stage of the development of TRD and of OPC, some of the causes were beyond remedy.

25X1

D. Mobilization Training Program

At some time in early 1950, OPC submitted to TRD its training requirements in the event of mobilization.* This project called for establishing a program of [redacted] instruction and training at a

25X1

* There appears to be no documentary record of the actual submittal of the OPC requirements to TRD. The first record of a discussion of the requirements, and of TRD's plan to meet them, appears in the minutes of a meeting of the Joint Training Committee on 20 July 1950.

SECRET

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

~~SECRET~~

the near future and that the safehouse section of the Area Training Branch would also be shifted to [redacted] The other 150 trainees, representing the OSO mobilization requirement, would receive advanced training at other facilities.

25X1

By March of 1951, TRD realized that to meet the new and expanding requirements, it must reorganize. In a Joint Training Committee meeting on 15 March 1951, [redacted] pointed out that TRD must plan to recruit and train instructors immediately to be ready for the increased training demands. The revised T/O submitted to the Committee by

25X1

[redacted] was based on providing training [redacted] OSO and OPC staff personnel per month, a total of [redacted] annually. Although [redacted] the Assistant DD/P for Administration, pointed out to the Committee that regardless of training estimates, TRD must base its organization realistically on the capabilities of Security to clear prospective employees, it was agreed that in any event TRD must realign its organization to fit the acquisition and utilization of the [redacted] area.

25X1

25X1

This was a period of somewhat frantic planning of courses, organization, and facilities. On 2 March 1951, [redacted] submitted a T/O to the ADD/A calling for the approval of [redacted] positions at once and the approval in principle of a planned T/O of [redacted]. On 7 March the

25X1

25X1

25X9

~~SECRET~~

Page Denied

Next 13 Page(s) In Document Denied

SECRET

Chapter V

Summary and Conclusion

The preceding chapters have recorded the problems and major activities of TRD during the 1949-51 period when the Division went through a transitional development from a relatively small staff, functioning in consonance with the traditions and practices inherited from OSS, to a large, complex training organization capable of meeting the ever-growing requirements for training in the clandestine activities that became distinctly those of the Central Intelligence Agency. This chapter places the 1949-51 period within the context of the time, summarizes significant problems and accomplishments, and capsulizes in chronological order the major developments of the period.

A. The Temper of the Times

25X1

The 1949-51 period when was Chief of TRD was a time when there was widespread belief that the cold war was about to turn hot and that general mobilization was more than a possibility. Indeed, the advent of the Korean War in 1950 not only gave credence to this belief but also brought to bear upon the Agency tremendous pressure

SECRET

SECRET

to meet the intelligence support requirements of the Korean War and to prepare for whatever wider conflagration might next be generated.

It was within this climate of tension and urgency that TRD -- without a solid administrative structure, without firm guidance in operational doctrine, and without enough manpower to do the basic jobs that had to be done -- was asked to train thousands of people in hundreds of operations skills. The fact that these thousands of people never materialized is irrelevant to the tensions of the time. When projects [] and the Mobilization Training Program were launched, for example, there was every reason to believe that they were essential to the security of the nation. The pressures were real and present, and the fact that TRD responded to them with practicable programs is in itself a high tribute to [] and the men and women who worked with him in TRD.

25X1

25X1

B. Summary

1. Development of TRD. Even if the 1949-51 period had not been one with a climate of threatening hot war and the consequent tensions and pressures, the task of developing the newly created Training Division to the point where it was fully capable of meeting the

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Agency's training requirements was a formidable one. To begin with, there were for TRD no clearly defined channels of command, no systematic budget and finance procedures, no proper method of handling personnel, and no system of liaison between TRD and the operating Offices. All of these problems had to be attacked, and solutions -- or partial solutions -- of them had to be found.

Equally troublesome was the problem of determining training requirements and designing courses to meet them -- particularly in the absence of clearly defined training objectives and agreed operational doctrine upon which objectives had to be based. Although the requirements-objectives-doctrine problem was not solved during the 1949-51 period, a start was made and the solving machinery was set in motion.

At the same time that TRD was plagued by problems of administration and training requirements, it was confronted with questions of jurisdictional responsibility -- first in the matter of support of overseas training, and later in the relationship of TRD to the newly created Director of Training. By the time left the Agency in April of 1951, TRD had assumed major responsibility for the support

25X1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

of overseas training.

2. Expansion of TRD. The developmental problems of TRD could not, of course, claim the undivided efforts of [] and his staff. At the same time that these problems were pressing for solution, TRD was being forced to expand its services to the operating Offices, to provide more training for more people and to develop the capability of offering new courses in virtually every phase of operational activity. To meet these demands it was necessary to develop

25X1

a workable internal organizational structure so that responsibilities could be assigned and authority delegated. The basic pattern first established by [] was a three-unit organization -- a Staff Training Unit, a [] Training Unit, and a Covert Training Unit. As requirements expanded, additional units were created to meet them -- an Assessment and Evaluation Unit and a Support Branch, for example -- and additional people were required to man the units.

In October of 1949, when [] unit was officially designated TRD, the Division TO authorized [] positions; in April of 1951, when Col. [] left the Agency, TRD had an authorized TO of [] positions.

25X9

25X9

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The rapid expansion of TRD activities and personnel strength naturally created staffing problems. It was almost impossible to fill all of the authorized slots with qualified people. Field operational activities got first priority, and there were not enough operationally qualified people available for assignment to instructor slots. Complicating the staffing problem was the policy of rotational assignment of personnel -- both out of TRD to operational jobs and from operational jobs into TRD. This phase of the staffing problem was a critical one throughout [] tenure, and it has continued, in some degree, up to the present time. 25X1

Along with the expansion of TRD's activities there came pressing requirements for additional course offerings and for additional space for training programs. New courses were developed and coordinated with the operating Offices, and additional space -- often makeshift and inadequate -- was found.

3. Special Problems. Concurrent with the problems inherent in the development and expansion of TRD, there arose a number of related special problems. For example, the number of OSO and OPC officers who preferred to "audit" courses instead of "take" them became so great that a system of limiting auditors had to be devised.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Also, the responsibility of providing Agency speakers for other government activities fell to TRD and required manpower and time that were needed in Agency training activities. TRD was given the responsibility of maintaining a "pool" for provisionally cleared personnel, an activity designed to keep people profitably employed while awaiting final clearance. Still another special problem arose with TRD's effort to establish liaison with [] training activities. Perhaps the most important of the special problems was the need for systematic improvement of the quality of training, a problem to which [] devoted a considerable part of his total time and effort.

25X1

25X1

25X1

~~SECRET~~

Page Denied

SECRET



25X1

C. Chronology

5 August 1949



25X1

appointed Chief, Training Staff, OSO.

By



25X1

5 August 1949.

14 September 1949

OSO and OPC training units formally

25X1

merged into single Staff under



Staff attached to OSO for organization

but Chief responsible to both AD/SO

and AD/PC.



25X1

14 September 1949.

17 October 1949

First official reference to conversion

of Training Staff to Training Division (TRD).

16 December 1949

Memorandum from CIA Executive Offi-

cer to CIA Management Officer; TRD to

continue under "committee-type" control --

i. e. Joint (OSO and OPC) Training Com-

mittee; remained so until 1 July 1951.

SECRET


SECRET

9 February 1950

TRD assumed responsibility for maintaining "pool" of uncleared personnel; pool became a section of the Basic and Interim Study Course (BISC).

25X1


21 June 1950



20 July 1950

TRD given responsibility for developing Mobilization Training Program.

25 July 1950



submitted to AD/SO and 25X1

AD/PC a statement of "The Mission of the Training Division," the first systematic recording of TRD's training responsibilities.

26 July 1950

AD/SO assigned to TRD responsibility for providing Agency speakers for non-Agency government activities.

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

9 November 1950



15 November 1950

Col. Matthew Baird, USAF, appointed
CIA Director of Training

25X1

20 December 1950

Project [redacted] approved.

3 January 1951

CIA Office of Training created, Col.
Baird in charge as Director of
Training.

4 January 1951

Office of Deputy-Director for Plans
(DD/P) created.

13 January 1951

TRD assigned to provide training
program for [redacted]

25X1

14 February 1951

[redacted] appointed OSO

25X1

22 March 1951

Training Officer -- the first appoint-
ment of a full-time training liaison
officer in a major Agency component.
Memorandum from the DCI, General
Smith, to the DD/A, the AD/SO,
the AD/PC, and the Director of

SECRET

SECRET

	Training clarifying the function of the Director of Training.	
1 April 1951	<div data-bbox="820 485 1149 535" style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 203px; height: 24px;"></div> appointed Acting	25X1
	Chief of TRD to replace <div data-bbox="1206 560 1430 613" style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 138px; height: 25px;"></div>	25X1
	who was recalled to military duty.	
18 April 1951	Office of Training transferred from DD/A to O/DCI. CIA Regulation No.	
	<div data-bbox="786 844 878 905" style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 57px; height: 29px;"></div> 18 April 1951.	25X1
June 1951	<div data-bbox="764 930 1479 1281" style="border: 1px solid black; width: 440px; height: 167px;"></div>	
26 June 1951	DD/P notified AD/SO and AD/PC that	25X1
	TRD would be detached from OSO as of 1 July 1951 and would become a com- ponent of the DD/P.	25X1
1 July 1951	CIA REGULATION <div data-bbox="1130 1608 1252 1661" style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 75px; height: 25px;"></div> assigned TRD, renamed Training (Covert), to the Office of Training under the nominal command of the Director of Training.	

SECRET


SECRET

Appendix A

Identification of Positions

Following are identifications of the positions held by the major
OSO, OPC, and DDP personnel mentioned. The positions identified
are those held during the approximate time-span of this paper. Military
ranks then held are given for military officers assigned to duty
with the Agency.

25X1



SECRET

Page Denied

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Denied

SECRET

Appendix B

Missions and Functions of TRD

Following is the statement of the mission and functions of TRD given in a memorandum of 25 July 1950, "The Mission of the Training Division," from Chief of TRD, to the AD/SO and the AD/PC:

25X1

Mission

Providing instruction in the several activities charged to OSO and OPC in order to qualify staff personnel in the planning, organization, conduct, and administration of these activities both in the field and in headquarters and in order to properly train agent personnel for their specific assignments.

Functions

- (1) To ascertain the training requirements of OSO and OPC;
- (2) to organize, supervise, and administer adequate training programs, staffs, and facilities within the U.S., to fulfill the training requirements of OSO and OPC, including staff personnel, agent

SECRET

SECRET

personnel

25X1

- (3) to provide assistance and technical staff supervision to training conducted in overseas areas;
- (4) to insure that the training of each individual is consistent with the cover and security of his proposed assignment;
- (5) to arrange and schedule with outside government and private agencies such other training as may be required;
- (6) to provide training evaluations of student personnel for assistance to their sponsoring branches in determining assignments;
- (7) to conduct such liaison within OSO, OPC, and the remainder of CIA and other outside agencies as may be required to provide a fully coordinated training program;
- (8) to conduct applied research on training content and method;
- (9) to prepare budgetary estimates for all training activity;
- (10) to administer overall TRD personnel, funds, supplies, and facilities;
- (11) to assist in the preparation of mobilization plans to fulfill training requirements of OSO and OPC in the event of an emergency;
- (12) to provide policy guidance and administrative support to the Assessment Staff.

SECRET

SECRET

Appendix C

[REDACTED] Remarks to Training Review Committee

25X1

25X1

Following is a condensation of the remarks of [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED] to the members of the Training Review Committee at the final meeting of the Committee on 19 June 1950; the condensation is based on the minutes of that meeting, and [REDACTED] own phraseology has been retained to the extent that the minutes recorded it:

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED] told the Committee that when training had first started, it pretty much had to accept the ideas that were lodged in the heads of the various instructors because hardly anything had been put down in black and white. Within the last year, he felt, tremendous strides had been made, but the only thing that was vitally important was whether the instruction was according to the requirements of OSO and OPC. "Are we teaching [REDACTED] the way OSO is actually conducting it?" "Are we teaching [REDACTED] the way the operational and planning staffs feel that we should teach it?" "Is the doctrine which we are developing identical to the doctrine which is being developed in OPC?"

25X1

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

[] went on to say that TRD was vitally interested in making certain that what was being said in class was according to the doctrine and the principles which the operational people were applying. He hoped that through this committee TRD would be able to bring the training effort into line with operations. He wanted to be shown where TRD was out of line and what could be done to improve the instruction, to make it realistic, and to keep it up to date. He furthermore hoped that out of this committee would come a procedure whereby TRD could coordinate instruction on doctrine, principles, techniques, and tactics with the operating Divisions. He went on to say that basically he felt that the relationship between Training and OSO and OPC was vitally important and he wanted to get down to a complete working arrangement. He stated that doctrine and coordination were his main concerns. He said that he welcomed criticism as long as it was constructive and not picayunish. He wanted to know what was being done wrong in Training because Training had to keep up to date and realistic.

SECRET

Page Denied

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied

SECRET

CIA Internal Use Only

*Access Controlled by
the Directorate of
Support*

SECRET